Supreme Court, Nassau County, County of Nassau v. Moloney by Orellana, Joaquin
Touro Law Review 
Volume 19 
Number 2 New York State Constitutional 
Decisions: 2002 Compilation 
Article 9 
April 2015 
Supreme Court, Nassau County, County of Nassau v. Moloney 
Joaquin Orellana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Orellana, Joaquin (2015) "Supreme Court, Nassau County, County of Nassau v. Moloney," Touro Law 
Review: Vol. 19 : No. 2 , Article 9. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol19/iss2/9 
This Excessive Fines is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. 
For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu. 
Supreme Court, Nassau County, County of Nassau v. Moloney 
Cover Page Footnote 
19-2 
This excessive fines is available in Touro Law Review: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol19/iss2/9 
EXCESSIVE FINES
United States Constitution Amendment VIII
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
New York Constitution Article I Section 5:'
Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines
imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be
inflicted ....
SUPREME COURT OF NASSAU COUNTY
County of Nassau v. Moloney'
(published October 2, 2002)
Terry Moloney was arrested for driving while intoxicated,
and as a result, police officers seized Moloney's 1995 Ford
2Explorer. Moloney subsequently pleaded guilty to the lesser
charge of driving while ability impaired due to alcohol
consumption.3 The County of Nassau instituted this action for
forfeiture of defendant's vehicle pursuant to Nassau County
Administrative Code 4 Section 8-7(g). 5 Moloney moved for
summary judgment to dismiss the complaint and have his vehicle
returned, and the County of Nassau cross-motioned for summary
judgment on the issue of forfeiture of defendant's vehicle.
6
tN.Y.L.J., Oct. 2, 2002, at 228, col. 2 (Nass. Co. Sup. Ct.).
2 Maloney, supra note 1.
3 Maloney, supra note 1.
4 NASS. Co. ADMIN. CODE §8- 7(g) (3) (1990) provides in pertinent part: "The
County of Nassau may commence a civil action for forfeiture to the County of
Nassau of the... instrumentality of a crime seized incident to an arrest for a
misdemeanor crime... upon a conviction for such misdemeanor
crime... against any person having an interest in such property."
5 Moloney, supra note 1.
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Moloney raised several arguments to support his motion for
summary judgment. 7 First, he argued seizure of his vehicle
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the New York State
Constitution.9 However, the court found that argument was without
merit. Moloney further argued that seizure of his vehicle violated
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution' ° and Article I, Section 5 of the New York
State Constitution." The Court granted the County's cross-motion
for summary judgment and Moloney's motion for summary
judgment limited only to the issue of hardship on the defendant.
12
The court looked to United States v Milbrand,13 which
articulates a three part test in determining whether seizure of
Moloney's vehicle was an excessive fine. 14 In Milbrand, law
enforcement officers conducted a consensual search and found a
large quantity of marijuana plants growing on and around the
defendant's property.' 5 The officers also found three loaded guns
and other drug paraphernalia, which all belonged to Milbrand's
son, Mark. 16 Mark pleaded guilty and was convicted in state court
of criminal possession of marijuana.' 7 The United States instituted
an action pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)18 for forfeiture of
7 Maloney, supra note 1.
8 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in pertinent part: "[N]or deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
9 Moloney, supra note 1; N.Y. CONST. art I, § 11 provides in pertinent part: "No
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any
subdivision thereof.. .."
10 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides : "Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
1 N.Y. CONST. art I, § 5 provides in pertinent part: "Excessive bail shall not be
required nor excessive fines imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual punishments
be inflicted. .. "
12 Moloney, supra note 1.
a 58 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1995).
14 id.
"5 Id. at 843.
16 id.
171d.
'" 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) provides in pertinent part: "The following shall be
subject to forfeiture to the United States .... All real property... which is used,
or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the
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defendant's property, and defendant filed a claim to the property. 19
The trial court denied defendant's claim and found defendant's
property forfeitable because the property was used to "facilitate a
narcotics felony and that Milbrand was not an innocent owner."
20
The Second Circuit affirmed and issued a three part test for
determining excessive fines.
2 1
The factors to be considered:
... include (1) the harshness of the forfeiture (e.g.,
the nature and value of the property and the effect
of forfeiture on innocent third parties) in
comparison to (a) the gravity of the offense, and (b)
the sentence that could be imposed on the
perpetrator of such an offense; (2) the relationship
between the property and the offense, including
whether use of the property in the offense was (a)
important to the success of the illegal activity, (b)
deliberate and planned or merely incidental and
fortuitous, and (c) temporally or spatially extensive;
and (3) the role and degree of culpability of the
22owner of the property.
Considering the seriousness of the offense and the value of
the marijuana compared to the value of the home, the court in
Milibrand held the forfeiture not to be harsh, thus satisfying the
first factor.23 The court concluded that the second factor was also
satisfied because the property was used to grow the marijuana and
advance the crime.24 Lastly, the court reasoned that Milbrand must
have known about her son's activities, thus having a significant
degree of culpability to satisfy the third factor. 25 Therefore, the
court of appeals agreed with the district court's conclusion that the
commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one
year's imprisonment ......
'9 Milbrand, 58 F.3d at 843.
20 id.
21 Id. at 847-49.
22 Id. at 847-48.
23 id. at 848.
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forfeiture did not violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment and affirmed the judgment.
26
The Moloney court also cited to Attorney-General of the
State of New York v. One Green 1993 Four Door Chrysler (Green
Chrysler),27 where at least one New York appellate department had
adopted the three part Milbrand test in determining whether fines
are excessive. 28 In Green Chrysler, state police had previously
discovered cocaine was being sold from the defendant's residence
and obtained a search warrant. 29 However, before the search
warrant was executed, state police received information that the
defendants, Kelly and German, would be traveling to Albany in
Kelly's 1993 Chrysler to purchase cocaine. 30 The state police
followed Kelly's vehicle to an apartment building in Albany,
where Kelly waited while German entered the building. 3 1 Upon
German's return, the troopers continued to follow the 1993
Chrysler, finally stopping the vehicle for vehicle and traffic law
violations. 32 The troopers found cocaine in the vehicle and on the
defendants, and the vehicle was subsequently seized. 33 The New
York State Attorney-General instituted a forfeiture proceeding
against the vehicle and Kelly moved for either a dismissal or a jury
trial to determine the excessiveness of the forfeiture under both the
New York and Federal constitutions. 34 Kelly was convicted of
criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree
35
and sentenced to five years probation with six months house arrest
and a $2,500 fine.36 The Third Department adopted the three part
test articulated in Milbrand and held the forfeiture of the 1993
26 Id. at 848-49.
P 217 A.D.2d 342, 636 N.Y.S.2d 868 (3d Dep't 1996) [hereinafter Green
Chrysler].
28 Moloney, supra note 1.





34 Green Chrysler, 17 A.D.2d at 344-45, 636 N.Y.S.2d at 870.
35 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.06 (5) (McKinney 2003) states: "A person is guilty
of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree when he
knowingly and unlawfully possesses cocaine and said cocaine weighs five
hundred milligrams or more."
36 Green Chrysler, 17 A.D.2d at 345, 636 N.Y.S.2d at 870.
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Chrysler did not violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the United
States Constitution or New York State Constitution.
37
The Third Department in Green Chrysler reasoned that the
second and third factors, which relate to "the relationship between
the property and the offense" and "the role and degree of
culpability of the owner of the property," were satisfied because
the defendant's vehicle was used to transport the cocaine and Kelly
was an active participant in the crime. 38 The court also found the
first factor, which relates to "the harshness of the forfeiture in
comparison to the gravity of the offense and the sentence that
could be imposed," was also satisfied. Kelly could have received a
harsher sentence as a result of her plea, and the vehicle in question
had already been replaced by a 1985 Chrysler.39 Therefore, the
Third Department held the forfeiture of the vehicle was not in
violation of either the Excessive Fines Clause of the United States
Constitution or the New York State Constitution.
40
Unsuccessfully, Moloney based his argument on United
States v. Bajakajian4 1 and its "grossly disproportional to the
gravity of the offense" test.42 In Bajakajian, the defendant, his
wife, and his two children were leaving on a flight to Italy when a
customs inspector approached them regarding the $230,000 found
in their suitcases. 43 The Bajakajians lied about the money they
were carrying and were subsequently searched. 4 The search
produced more money, and all the currency was ultimately
seized.45 Consequently, Bajakajian was arrested for attempting to
transport $357,144 without reporting it, in violation of 31 U.S.C. §
5316(a)(1)(A) 46 and for making a false statement to a customs
agent.
47
37Id. at 348, 636 N.Y.S.2d at 872.38 Id. at 347, 636 N.Y.S.2d at 872.
31 Id. at 348, 636 N.Y.S.2d at 872.
40 id.
4 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
42 Moloney, supra note 1 (citing Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334).
43 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 324.
" Id. at 324-25.
4 ld. at 325.
4631 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A) provides in pertinent part:
[A] person or an agent or bailee of the person shall file a
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The United States Supreme Court held that forfeiture of
Bajakajian's $357,144 violated the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment because it "would be grossly disproportional to
the gravity of his offense." 48 Because the government proceeded
against the defendant in a criminal in personam proceeding rather
than a civil in rem proceeding, the Court determined the forfeiture
to be punitive and analyzed the forfeiture under a proportionality
test.49 The Court announced that a punitive forfeiture would violate
"the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the
gravity of a defendant's offense." 50 The Court found defendant's
crime to be "solely a reporting offense" with a maximum fine of
$5,000.51 The Court also found the Government's deprivation of
information to be minimal harm, which "caused no loss to the
public fisc." 52 The Court concluded that the gravity of Bajakajian's
offense could not compare to the forfeiture of $357,144, and thus,
violated the Excessive Fines Clause. 53 However, the Moloney court
rejected this test and distinguished the Bajakajian case for "fines
imposed in criminal cases where the property sought to be forfeited
was not the object of a civil forfeiture action."
54
Adhering to the three part test announced in Milbrand and
subsequently adopted by the Third Department in Green Chrysler,
the Moloney court found the second and third factors were easily
satisfied because Moloney pleaded guilty to an offense that
involved his vehicle. 55 The three Milbrand factors were analyzed:
"(1) the harshness of the forfeiture... (2) the relationship between
the property and the offense... and (3) the role and degree of
transports, is about to transport, or has transported, monetary
instruments of more than $ 10,000 at one time-- from a place
in the United States to or through a place outside the United
States ....47 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 325.481 Id. at 324.
49 Id. at 333-34.
'0 Id. at 334.
"' Id. at 337-38.
52 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 339.
" Id. at 339-40.54 Moloney, supra note 1.
55 Maloney, supra note 1. When a lower court in New York is faced with an
issue of first impression, it must look to other appellate departments if its own
appellate department has not yet decided such an issue.
270 [Vol 19
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culpability of the owner of the property."56 However, in applying
the first factor of the three part Milbrand test, which balances "the
harshness of the forfeiture (e.g., the nature and value of the
property and the effect of forfeiture on innocent third parties) in
comparison to (a) the gravity of the offense, and (b) the sentence
that could be imposed on the perpetrator of such an offense," the
court determined there was a genuine issue of material fact that a
bench trial needed to resolve. 7 The court noted that the vehicle
was worth more than the maximum fine imposed, and that the
defendant, a carpenter, made his living with the vehicle in
question, which was his only vehicle. 58 The court reasoned it may
be overly harsh to impose a forfeiture on a person with a
deteriorating financial condition and might violate the Excessive
Fines Clause of the United States Constitution and New York State
Constitution. Therefore, the court ordered discovery and a bench
trial to determine the issue of hardship.
59
In conclusion, the three part test annunciated in Milbrand
and adopted in Green Chrysler, is currently the standard among
lower New York courts for reviewing whether a fine imposed,
such as forfeiture of real or personal property, is overly excessive
and in violation of the Excessive Fines Clause of the United States
Constitution and New York State Constitution. Because neither the
New York State Court of Appeals nor the Appellate Division,
Second Department has decided on the issue of excessive fines, the
court was bound by the Third Department's decision in Green
Chrysler and issued its determination accordingly.
60
Although the Moloney court held Nassau County
Administrative Code was not violataive of the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Federal or New York State Constitution, just prior to
publishing this Purview, the Appellate Division, Second
Department held in County of Nassau v. Canavan that the Nassau
County Administrative Code is unconstitutionally vague and
therefore violates due process.6' The Second Department held that
56 Milbrand, 58 F.3d at 847-48.
57 Moloney, supra. note 1.
58 Maloney, supra note 1.
59 Maloney, supra note 1.60 Maloney, supra note 1.
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because the statute did not "define any offense or petty offense or
provide any legislative history for its forfeiture sections" that the
statute did not provide "fair notice."62 Although the county
conceded that forfeiture is utilized only for alcohol related offenses
and not merely for reckless driving or driving with a suspended
license, the court found it problematic that the statute is too
general. 3 Furthermore, the court reasoned that because the statute
did not provide the public with adequate notice what of conduct
will result in forfeiture, there is an enhanced "opportunity for
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